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Response
Frederick Swaniker
The impact of globalization on the world’s financial markets became
brutally obvious in mid-August, when Russia abruptly decided to let
the value of the ruble fall and to default on its debt payments to for-
eign investors. This ignited a financial panic in markets as widespread
as Malaysia, Germany, Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. In
its wake, the devaluation left billions of dollars in losses for Wall Street
investment banks and hedge funds, as well as financial institutions
and corporations in almost every corner of the globe. This is but the
latest in a series of economic events, such as the Mexican peso crisis in
1994 and the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997, that have
occurred in one corner of the globe, only to produce disturbing reper-
cussions across the world.
Fueled in large part by advancements in information technology
and changes in economic policy, financial markets have become
increasingly correlated with each other. Economies that were once sep-
arated by high transport costs and barriers to trade and finance are
now enmeshed in an ever-tightening web of economic interactions. As
a result of this globalization of markets, economies separated by vast
amounts of physical space are interacting in a much smaller “economic
space.” One consequence of this tighter economic space is that events
that occur in one country cause ripple effects in a multitude of others.
Given that the current turmoil in global financial markets was
fueled in large part by events in Russia, the subject of Dr. Vladimir
Popov’s essay—the impact of what he terms “internationalization” on
the Russian economy — is especially timely. Dr. Popov describes how
the freeing of foreign trade and the introduction of the convertibility of
the ruble resulted in a sharp decline in exports and contributed to the
reduction in economic output in Russia. And he argues that the Rus-
sian government mishandled the internationalization process in three
major ways: first, by sustaining an overvalued exchange rate of the
ruble; second, by failing to stimulate export-oriented growth; and
third, by not doing enough to attract foreign direct investment.
I begin my comments on Dr. Popov’s essay with what I think are the
major contributions of his paper to this intellectual discourse. Then I
will offer my thoughts on some shortcomings of the paper. I will con-
clude by presenting my own perspective on the subject.
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The first and most insightful part of Dr. Popov’s arguments is his
recognition of the overvaluation of the Russian currency, the ruble. By
maintaining a fixed exchange rate to the dollar, while natural resource
exports grew rapidly, the ruble became overvalued; this, in turn, hurt
non-natural resource exports and stifled domestic commerce. It was
only a matter of time before foreign-exchange traders recognized that
the ruble was overvalued, resulting in the massive devaluation and
global chaos that we are witnessing today. In retrospect, it is quite
clear that the ruble was overvalued (which is why it came crashing
down two months ago). However, given that Dr. Popov wrote his
paper in early summer of 1998—that is, before the ruble crashed—his
observations are rather clairvoyant. In fact, several Wall Street cur-
rency traders would still be employed today had they read Dr. Popov’s
essay, taken his words to heart, and avoided the ruble!
The second of Dr. Popov’s contributions is his examination of the
idea that “speed does not matter” in determining economic perfor-
mance during transition from central planning to free-market, open
economies. This issue has been a major sticking point in academic
debates on transition; there is, as he mentions, a great divide between
“gradualists” and “shock therapists.” By showing that speed of transi-
tion is not a relevant and appropriate variable, he resolves this con-
tentious debate.
Third and finally, Dr. Popov demonstrates, through econometric
analysis, that initial conditions are indeed significant in explaining the
economic performance of Russia compared with more successful
economies in Eastern Europe. The term initial conditions refers to the
state of the economies in Eastern Europe before they began their tran-
sition to free markets and integration into the world economy. Most
scholars of this topic ignore these starting points and claim, for exam-
ple, that Poland and Hungary’s economies performed much better
than did Russia’s after 1989 because they were quicker to adopt West-
ern “free-market reforms,” were quicker to open up foreign trade, and
became integrated more quickly into global capital markets. But these
claims ignore the fact that Poland and Hungary had already begun to
participate in the global economy long before Russia did in 1989, and,
as a result, were better positioned to compete globally than was Rus-
sia.
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My first concern about Dr. Popov’s essay is my disappointment that
he barely discussed events that have most recently occurred in Russia.
Instead, he focuses primarily on events that occurred there between
1989 and 1996. Since Russia only recently opened itself to the outside
world and the effects of globalization are only now being seen there,
this is a particularly opportune time to discuss such effects. For exam-
ple, I would have liked Dr. Popov to touch upon the impact of global-
ization on business in Russia — how American firms such as Vogue,
McDonald’s, Merrill Lynch, Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream, and Microsoft are
aggressively vying for shares of the Russian market; how foreign
investors have flocked (at least until recently) to Moscow’s stock mar-
ket; how Russian banks, businesses, and the government came to bor-
row heavily from international investors; and so on.
I am also curious to know how the integration of Russia into the
world economy is affecting Russian politics, culture, values, norms,
and beliefs. For instance, how is the ordinary person on the street in
Russia coping with the impact of globalization? How does the Russian
public perceive this force called globalization which has enabled citi-
zens to buy thousands of once-unobtainable foreign products but has,
at the same time, destroyed so much of their paper wealth in just a few
days of hectic trading on Wall Street. It would also have been enlight-
ening for Dr. Popov to discuss, for example, the role that Western
advice from institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund)
played in Russia’s post-Soviet economic disaster. Other questions left
unanswered include: What pressures are being exerted on Russian pol-
icy-makers as a result of the harsh blow that the global economy has
dealt Russia? Are there pressures to slap controls on capital markets,
create tariff barriers, and perhaps renationalize some strategic indus-
tries that have been hurt by global competition? Are there any positive
aspects to the integration of Russia into the global economy — such as
the influx of new ideas, the availability of higher-quality goods, and
the introduction of Western methods of management?
The second criticism I have of Dr. Popov’s essay is that it does not
directly address the theme of this year’s Roundtable; the bulk of it
focuses on economic events that have occurred inside Russia. Many of
the events Dr. Popov describes have little to do globalization but are,
instead, remnants from the era of central planning. He does not ade-
quately address how these changes inside Russia have affected the
world outside Russia. Judging by the effect of the present Russian eco-
nomic crisis on global markets, Russia plays an increasingly important
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role in world markets—due largely to its prominence as an exporter of
oil, diamonds, and other natural resources and as a potentially lucra-
tive and massive market for European, American, and Asian firms. Dr.
Popov also fails to make any connection to the concept of economic
space. As demonstrated, with the increasing linkages between Russia’s
economy and the economies of other countries, Russia’s case is a won-
derful example of the shrinking of economic space in the world today.
With the deregulation of financial markets worldwide, the sheer
volume of money flowing across borders has exploded dramatically.
As a result, a few thousand dollars saved by a person in Minnesota can
be used to finance the government’s deficit in Thailand. With so much
money in search of investment opportunities, it is extremely tempting
for companies and governments in the developing world to become
addicted to this seemingly “free” money, and to take on more and
more credit than is prudent. In my opinion, the most important lesson
we can take away from the Russian and Asian crises is that the less-
developed countries in Africa and Latin America should be absolutely certain
that their economies are ready both institutionally and politically before
jumping onto the global bandwagon and starting to collect as many
foreign dollars as they can. Only credible, strong, and stable economic
institutions and political regimes can prevent the inflow of foreign
money from wreaking havoc in the local economy. Otherwise, volatile
private capital—which flowed in so rapidly—can flow out even faster,
causing entire financial systems to collapse. These less-developed
countries also should avoid the mistake of becoming too dependent on
“global dollars,” as companies and governments in Asia and Russia
did. Unless these steps are taken, countries such as Brazil and South
Africa, which are viewed as the next frontier by global investors, will
also be devastated by a Russian-style crisis.
I would also like to emphasize that, despite that caveat, I am not
suggesting that developing countries should withdraw from the global
economy. The mishaps that occurred in Asia in 1997 did so after more
than twenty years of solid economic growth and massive increases in
living standards financed in large part by foreign investment and aug-
mented by very open, export-oriented economies. The benefits of par-
ticipating in the global economy—gains from trade and the acquisition
of knowledge and technology — are undeniable, and I firmly believe
that these countries should, by all means, take part. But they should
make sure that they have a solid financial system, a transparent legal
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system, and a stable political system before trying to attract as much
foreign investment as they can.
I also contend that there has to be greater economic cooperation
between nations if this era of shrinking global economic space is to be a
prosperous one. The system as it exists today simply will not be sus-
tainable in the long run. Further, the powerful industrialized nations
and the institutions they control — such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund — pressure developing and transition
economies to free their exchange rates, engage in free trade, and partic-
ipate fully in the global capital markets. Yet when disasters strike, as in
Russia and Southeast Asia, these same industrialized nations and mul-
tilateral institutions are often slow to assist the stricken countries or are
unable to do so. When the IMF requests funding to aid a country in cri-
sis, the United States Congress may tie up the bill for months; by the
time this funding is finally approved, it is too late to alleviate the crisis,
so whatever money is thrown in to fight the crisis is wasted. Countries
must work together in two ways. First, they must prevent such crises
from occurring at all — for example, by regulating speculative invest-
ments and reckless lending to developing countries. And second, the
developed nations should also be willing to act quickly to assist their
less-fortunate brethren in times of crisis, to prevent these crises from
afflicting the rest of the global economy. If the global economy is to
succeed, a spirit of international cooperation needs to arise.
On the eve of a new millennium, global markets are rapidly con-
verging into one big, complex amalgam. This promises great prosper-
ity for some countries, as has been demonstrated by the dramatic
increases in wealth of the Asian “Tigers” and by the benefits reaped by
companies that have decided to compete globally. Yet this new prox-
imity of markets brings with it the threat of increased instability and a
dangerous interdependence among markets, as exemplified by the
widespread effects of the recent Russian crisis. The ever-smaller eco-
nomic space in which the world now operates presents enormous chal-
lenges to the multinational companies that seek to remain competitive
in the global marketplace. Even more serious are the challenges that
regulators and governments around the world face, as they wrestle
with the powerful and potentially destructive forces of globalization.
The looming question now is: Who will prevail? The multinational
companies and savvy Wall Street currency traders? Or will govern-
ments and multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, be able
to maintain control? If an even balance between these forces can be
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achieved, the result will be a new and better world. The present disas-
ter in Russia, which threatens the world with prolonged instability and
the possible rise of an increasingly isolated and hostile state with thou-
sands of nuclear weapons, reveals how destructive the forces of global-
ization can be. Moving forward, the nations of this world need to
cooperate and, thus, prevent the occurrence of other such crises.
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